Integration and Control: The Governing of Urban Marginality in Western Europe

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Abstract

Drawing on the figurational sociology of Norbert Elias and the Foucauldian governmentality approach, this article outlines the political rationalities and governmental technologies pertaining to the territorial governance of urban marginality in Western Europe. Whereas many authors have suggested that segregation is key to the governing of urban marginality in the USA and perhaps the post-industrial city generally, I suggest that, at least in Western Europe, marginality is governed through integration. The argument is illustrated with examples from the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium.

During the decades after the second world war, the state and its guardians could view and frame the challenges to their authority in deprived neighborhoods as expressions of residual social problems which would disappear as the welfare state expanded and urban renewal proceeded. William H. Whyte (1956: 67) captured the mood in his The Organization Man: ‘The big questions are all settled; we know the direction, and while many minor details remain to be cleared up, we can be pretty sure of enjoying a wonderful upward rise’.

The modernistic renewal plans of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s exemplified the ambition to achieve order by design. Any remaining deprivation or deviation could be seen as the residue of a bygone era, soon to be swept away.

The onslaught of neoliberalism has changed this situation as the prospect of resolving marginality through social and employment policies has become increasingly unrealistic. Contemporary urban marginality is not residual but ‘advanced’. Advanced marginality results from ‘a macrosocietal drift towards inequality, the mutation of wage labour (entailing both deproletarianisation and casualisation), the retrenchment of welfare states, and the spatial concentration and stigmatisation of poverty’ (Wacquant, 1999: 1639). Advanced marginality represents a daily burden for its immediate victims but this article’s premise is that it also poses problems for governance actors. As neighborhoods degenerate into zones of relegation, the state’s monopoly over symbolic and physical violence (Bourdieu, 2000: 186) is increasingly challenged. Recent large-scale rebellions in the UK and France spectacularly demonstrate the state’s inability to enlist consent or enforce order in deprived areas. The failure to properly govern also expresses itself in a myriad of other, more mundane ways — when people shrug as they hear politicians speak, when teachers cannot make their pupils listen to them, when youth claim public spaces, when trash litters the streets or when welfare agencies fail to process their case loads. In everyday conversations and media reports, the government is questioned as it fails to deliver on the promise of defending order, setting into motion a continuous search

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for attempts to gain or regain control over populations and territories that somehow escape the state’s grip. The areas and their residents come to be seen as disconnected from society, as places that lack civilized manners and people. Thus, the starting point for this article is the proposition that advanced urban marginality and the social phenomena with which it is associated — criminality, apathy, unemployment, rebellion, deviant norms and values — have to be governed in one way or another and that such governance necessarily involves the organization of space.

One common response to the threat posed by marginalized urbanites is the intensification of repression. A number of authors have charted the global rise of revanchism (Smith, 1996), a resentment against the (black) urban poor that fuels the ‘rolling out of the gargantuan penal state’ and ‘redraws the perimeter, mission, and modalities of action of public authority when it comes to managing the deprived and stigmatized populations stuck at the bottom of the class, ethnic and urban hierarchy’ (Wacquant, 2010a: 74; Macleod and Johnstone, 2012; Powell, 2013). It has been argued that we have abandoned disciplinary society and entered a control society (cf. Deleuze, 1995). Deprived subjects are no longer observed and disciplined to transform their attitudes and behavior but merely to neutralize them. The organization of urban space plays a pivotal role in these modes of surveillance and repression as the stigmatized poor are removed from zones of affluence and forced into areas of relegation. As competition in the housing market creates a segregated and stratified residential pattern, the state takes on the role of policing boundaries between segregated areas and containing the threats posed by disenfranchised urbanites. Residential segregation is part of a more comprehensive mode of governance by which the poor are controlled through enclosure. Wacquant (2010b: 204) speaks of a strategy of ‘punitive containment’ that offers ‘relief not to the poor but from the poor by forcibly “disappearing” the most disruptive of them, from the shrinking welfare rolls on the one hand and into the swelling dungeons of the carceral castle on the other’. Many authors foretold a future of dual, quartered or divided cities where territorialized surveillance and boundary enforcement are used to keep marginalized populations in check (Marcuse, 1989; Mollenkopf and Castells, 1991; Sennett, 1994: chapter 7; Wacquant, 2010b: 199).

However, while there is no doubt that repression and segregation have intensified in recent years, it is doubtful that ‘punitive containment’ captures all modes of governing urban marginality, even in the case of the USA. The large majority of urban poor black people do not reside in areas that are fully segregated along the lines of class and race (Small, 2008). The Chicago South Side has been key to theorizing about segregation by Wacquant and others but it is in many ways an outlier (Small, 2007). More importantly, the singular focus on segregation may distract from qualitatively different ways of governing marginality. In the last decades, the US government, far from harnessing market-induced segregation, has been following an aggressive agenda of dispersal and deconcentration (Goetz, 2011), which is a clear sign that the relegation of dangerous classes is not the only — and perhaps not even the dominant — mode of spatially governing urban marginality.

This is even truer for the countries of Western Europe. In these countries, deepening segregation is not only inevitable in conditions of increasing class polarization; it is also unbearable to states seeking to retain the monopoly of symbolic and physical violence. When segregation results in the spatial concentration of defamed and deprived groups, this creates tensions in the everyday management of territories, urging the government and its partners to develop strategies to promote integration. The exact meaning of the notion of ‘integration’ varies strongly but its omnipresence in political and policy debates signals a fear that the concentration or enclosure of stigmatized and deprived groups may undermine the stability of society. Areas where these groups concentrate have become key sites for attempts to integrate marginalized groups into society’s mainstream. While the government and its partners may have lost, willfully or not, the capacity to curb inequalities and prevent marginalization through macro-social policies, they have developed a range of conceptualizations and measures to deal with marginality in situ.
This article takes on the task of analyzing these modes of (re)territorialized governance with the help of figurational sociology (cf. Elias, 1978; 1994) and the governmentality approach (cf. Foucault, 1991). The goal is not to undertake detailed comparisons of how marginality is governed in different countries but to provide a general analysis and identify governmental technologies and political rationalities that are found across different countries of Western Europe (and perhaps elsewhere). The first section briefly sketches the theoretical background to the analysis and argues that integration, like segregation, represents a mode of governing marginality. The second section then examines the development of urban policy in three different countries — the Netherlands, Belgium and the UK — and suggests that these policies can be understood as attempts to gain control over deprived and defamed urban neighborhoods and their inhabitants. The third section illustrates the argument by examining rationalities and technologies of integration. It identifies how governance actors conceive and create social and institutional infrastructures to exercise control over territories where the state is challenged. The final section sums up the analysis and identifies the contours of a regime for governing urban marginality in Western Europe.

Integration as social control

A number of authors have noted that national governments have lost or handed over the capacity to steer economic and social processes. The state has been ‘hollowed out’ (Jessop, 1994) and ‘the social’ has been eroded (Rose, 1996). As the nation state functions less as a container for economic, social cultural and political processes (Taylor, 1994; Hajer, 2003), the state reterritorializes at subnational and supranational levels (Brenner, 2004). The development of urban policy has been key to reorganizing relations between different levels of government and among various governance actors (Jacquier, 2005).

While there are important differences between countries and over time, a striking general trend is the growing salience of the urban neighborhood as a governance site (Aalbers and van Beckhoven, 2010). The neighborhood has become, on the one hand, a laboratory for the development of new modes of deliberative planning and social innovation (Moulaert et al., 2005) and, on the other hand, a prime site for experimenting with new modes of repression and surveillance (Schinkel and Van den Berg, 2011). In many countries and at the level of the European Union, policies have been developed to promote the integrated development of deprived urban neighborhoods (see below). The increasing salience of the neighborhood as a governance site has been remarkably undertheorized. Although much attention has been given to the growing salience of cities and supranational entities, few scholars have addressed the growing salience of neighborhoods.

Figurational sociology can help to begin to make sense of this development. The figurational sociology of Norbert Elias provides a basic set of concepts to grasp the connection between civilizing processes and state formation (Elias, 1978; 1994; Wacquant, 1997). Instead of locating the explanation for certain interventions in the benign or revanchist motives of elites, figurational sociology directs attention to the webs of interdependencies in which processes take place. The basic premise informing Elias’s study into civilizing processes is that the extension and intensification of interdependencies result in greater self-control through various mechanisms. One such mechanism is state formation. As interdependencies increase in scope and intensity, formal and informal institutions develop to regulate conduct between interdependent territories and strata. As the pressures towards normalization intensify, deviancies are created and reinforced — what first was regarded as normal or at any rate not noteworthy becomes redefined as a public problem to be solved through public action (De Swaan, 1988).

These insights help us to understand the role of the state in deprived and defamed areas. The society as a body may be a functionalist fiction but the state does have a
nervous system of sorts in the form of interdependencies that link peripheral urban territories to the centers of bureaucratic management and symbolic production. The reason for the strong interest of Western Europe’s governments for deprived neighborhoods is that they, or rather the governance actors that have a stake in them, are strongly connected to the surrounding environment (Uitermark, 2005). In the centralized welfare states of Western Europe, strong interdependencies exist between governance actors in deprived neighborhoods and central governments. Education, housing, police, welfare and care are typically organized through institutional and professional networks that traverse neighborhoods and are funded — at least in part — by and through the local and central state. High crime rates, dropout rates, health problems, unemployment, social tensions and so on may be felt first by local schools, precincts, welfare offices, party chapters or associations but they find their way through institutional conduits that channel irritations at the political and bureaucratic edges to the centers of bureaucratic management and symbolic production.

The entanglement of interdependencies between (governance actors in) deprived areas and (governance actors in) their environment means that problems cannot be spatially contained or resolved through relegation. These interdependencies form the basis of the integrationist mode of governing marginality:

The kind of ‘triage’ and purposive desertion of urban areas to ‘economize’ on public services that has befallen the American metropolis is unimaginable in the European political context with its fine-grained bureaucratic monitoring of the national territory. At the same time, there can be no question that the capacity of European states to govern territories of relegation is being severely tested and may prove unequal to the task if recent trends towards the spatial concentration of joblessness continue (Wacquant, 1999: 1645).

Developments in urban policy in Western Europe over the last 20–30 years can be seen as a response to this challenge to effectuate more control with fewer resources. While governments lost or delegated control over the macro processes generating inequalities, they intensified their efforts to locally manage the pernicious effects of such processes. Although urban neighborhoods obviously are not state spaces in the same way that nation states are, recurrent rounds of urban policy have transformed neighborhoods into ‘power containers’ (Giddens, 1987: 15–17) where specific tasks and functions are organized. At the neighborhood level, the development of an infrastructure for remedial and preventive intervention constitutes an alternative or complementary form of social control to segregation and repression (Cohen, 1985; Castel, 1991; Neocleous, 1996; 2000). The integration of potentially dangerous groups into political and administrative communities whose self-regulating capacities can be enhanced and capitalized upon constitutes one historical example of this model (Cohen, 1987; Cruikshank, 1999: chapter 3). In fact, both strategies — which can respectively be labeled as ‘segregationist’ and ‘integrationist’ or, in Jock Young’s more imaginative vocabulary, ‘bulimia’ and ‘cannibalism’ (Young, 1999) — have been used throughout history and already figured in Foucault’s analysis of the governmental responses to the plague and leprosy; while the first disease was contained through exclusion, the second was controlled through surveillance (Foucault, 1977: 198).

While Elias provides insights into the extent to which governments will feel called upon to civilize deprived and defamed areas, Foucault’s work allows us to understand how governments act as it bears directly on the organization of space and the management of populations, highlighting the ways in which disciplinary measures and governmental techniques combine to generate particular state forms (Foucault, 2009). In his seminal text on governmentality, Foucault (1991) distinguishes two lines of political thought. The first line of thought, associated with the medieval Polizeiwissenschaft, is called ‘pastoral’ and aims to integrally control the entirety of society. The second line of thought emerges during the Enlightenment and is referred to as ‘liberal’ because the aim is no longer to configure each of society’s elements in the right way but to allow society’s different spheres to self-organize. Whereas pastoral modes of governing view the people...
as a herd to be guided by the sovereign, liberal modes of governing view society as a city capable of organizing itself. As Colin Gordon argues, ‘The focus of Foucault’s interest in modern governmental rationalities consists, precisely, in the realization of what he calls the “daemonic” coupling of “city-game” and “shepherd-game”: the invention of a form of secular political pastorate which couples “individualization” and “totalization”’ (Gordon, 1991: 8). Contemporary policies toward deprived and defamed neighborhoods signal the prevalence of pastoral and liberal modes of governing: while governments develop ‘integral’ policies to govern areas and populations, they also rely on citizens and civil society to take an active part in the governing of their habitats. Governmentality researchers take seriously what administrators say and do. Instead of viewing their discourses as mere expressions of deeper structures, they investigate how state administrators conceive the problematic of governing: how are particular problems framed, how do subjectivities form, what are the modes of observation that enable administrators to rule from a distance and how are interventions conceived and practiced? In this understanding, the state is not a monolithic entity but rather ‘a mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities’ (Foucault, cited in Jessop, 2006: 36).

In the case of the governance of urban marginality, these diverse governmentalities are generated in constant interactions between professionals working in deprived neighborhoods, administrators seeking to govern these areas, and policy experts and academics providing the intellectual tools to conceptualize areas and their inhabitants in such a way that they become amenable to governmental action. While there may not be a singular policy discourse, the various strands of policy discourse have some level of ‘strategic coherence’ (cf. Rose, 2000a) that is also expressed in shared declarations on urban policy, such as the Vienna Forum or the Leipzig Charter (see Table 1). There is thus a more or less coherent way of thinking regarding the social forces in urban neighborhoods and the ways in which policy can seek to intervene in these areas. Though each discipline, country, city or profession retains idiosyncrasies, the last two decades have seen the convergence of forces pertaining to the governance of urban marginality into a regime composed of heterogeneous governmentalities (Dean, 1999: 211).

My argument is that the relatively strong interdependencies between central state and deprived neighborhoods have created conditions under which segregation and the development of no-go areas are regarded as major threats, not just to the residents of areas of relegation but to entire societies. In response, local and national administrators, in conjunction with their partners, have developed a range of governmentalities to frame and curb these threats. What ties these heterogeneous governmentalities together is the idea and aspiration of integration, both of lower-class minorities and the territories where they reside. Over the last decades, the concept of integration has become absolutely central to policy discourses of the governments of Western Europe (Favell, 2003; Schinkel, 2007; 2008; Uitermark, 2012). Immigrants who have entered the national territory are regarded as a possible threat to the integrity of the nation, especially if they (are thought to) cluster together in residential or social environments (Finney and Simpson, 2009) or inhabit parallel life worlds (Phillips and Harrison, 2010: 224). While comprehensive frameworks have been set up at the borders to regulate the inflow of migrants (Joppke, 2007), the fear that society’s integrity is under threat also finds its expression in civilizing missions in deprived areas (Macleod and Johnstone, 2012). Ethnic and religious minorities in particular are deemed to be ‘outside’ of society (Schinkel, 2010). They have to be brought in — they have to integrate, to participate and to respect the norms and values embodied in the state.1 To put it as tersely as possible, I propose to study integration as social control.

1 In the USA, such a process might be referred to as assimilation (Ruiz-Tagle, 2013: 399). However, whereas the meaning is similar, the way the notion is used is not. Assimilation is today used mainly as lay and scholarly concept in the USA. In contrast to ‘integration’ in the context of Western Europe, assimilation is not at the center of political rationalities and governmental technologies (Glazer, 1993).
Analyzing efforts to promote integration as attempts to gain and exercise social control may raise some objections. A first objection considers the motives of authorities — is it not cynical to assume they want control? The obvious answer to the objection of cynicism is that the dominant framing of minorities and deprived areas is not that they are the result of exploitation or racism but rather that they suffer from a lack of civil morality and too high concentrations of problem groups. But when authorities and professionals are primarily interested in helping poor minorities, they still need a measure of control — they need to be able to identify these groups, reach out to them and incorporate them into programs, all of which requires considerable statecraft. Understanding these forms of statecraft is what I intend here. A second objection is that analyzing interventions in terms of control appears to suggest that residents do not benefit. Residents may very well benefit because authorities and the majority of residents in deprived areas share an interest in promoting civilized conduct. There is rarely, if ever, a clear opposition between communities on the one hand and authorities on the other. Sometimes residents suffer as they are subjected to surveillance or displacement; at other times residents appreciate or even call for more comprehensive and intrusive governance of their living environments. But the precise balance of advantages and disadvantages for different groups of residents is of no relevance when we want to analyze the forms governance takes on. Policies are the result of struggles. They are, as a rule, messy and contradictory. The point of the present exercise thus is not to judge whether policies are good or bad (they are necessarily better for some than for others) or to test policy assumptions (as if there were a policy theory akin to a scientific theory) but to identify the rationalities and technologies that structure the field in which urban policymakers operate. These rationalities and technologies are not centrally imposed but emerge through interactions among policymakers as well as between policymakers and the areas they seek to govern. They structure the range of thinkable and doable options.

A third objection could be that concepts like ‘integration’ and ‘segregation’ are complex and ambivalent and therefore should be clearly defined. However, here I am interested in the territorial governance of urban marginality, not in developing the concepts of integration and segregation analytically or arguing how integration should be achieved (see Ruiz-Tagle, 2013). Both concepts are indeed elusive as they can refer to cultural, political, economic and moral dimensions in different areas ranging from workplaces and public spaces to neighborhoods and life worlds. Underlying these many different concepts, however, is a sentiment, widely held by policymakers in the field of social and urban policy, that — to paraphrase a motto attributed to Margaret Thatcher — ‘there is such thing as society’ that is at risk of falling apart and therefore requires patching. In the broadest possible sense, segregation refers to those forces that pull society apart while integration refers to the forces that keep it together. While these general notions guide policies, they take on different guises in different countries and policy fields. The polyvalence of the concept enables policymakers at different administrative scales and policy domains to use it as a guiding rationality for exercising control over marginalized areas. Rather than clarifying or elaborating the concepts of integration, my purpose is to identify the contours of an integrationist regime that spans different scales and policy domains.

Urban policy and the integrity of the nation: the Netherlands, Belgium and the UK

The emergence of integrated neighborhood development is a broad trend evident across (and beyond) Europe (see Table 1). To focus the discussion, I provide a brief examination of urban policy in the Netherlands, Belgium and the UK and suggest that interventions within deprived urban neighborhoods can be understood as attempts to gain or regain control over these areas. The next section then discusses technologies and rationalities of control pertaining to the governance of deprived urban areas in more detail.
In the Netherlands, the government first started experimenting with integrated neighborhood development in the 1980s. It was widely felt that the influx of immigrants eroded social cohesion and degraded the image of these neighborhoods. Governance actors within these neighborhoods, like local administrators and housing corporations, argued that they became increasingly difficult to manage. Moreover, it was feared that the privatization of the housing market would intensify residential segregation and the formation of concentration areas (Priemus, 1997). Public and policy debate considered these neighborhoods as frontlines where the discontents of multicultural society were manifestly visible. In the 1990s and 2000s, policies to improve social cohesion and economic integration were complemented by physical restructuring and tenure conversion (from the social into the private sector). The overall goal of the policy is to prevent a ‘downward spiral’ of neighborhoods at risk by improving their housing market

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<td>Leipzig Charter on Sustainable Cities</td>
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position, livability and safety (Uitermark, 2003). More recently, policymakers have been more explicit in their ambition to ‘reconquer’ deprived neighborhoods through a mix of repressive and social policies (see Engbersen et al., 2006; Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008). Integrated neighborhood development thus came to be seen as a central component in a larger effort to curb the negative side effects of immigration of Mediterranean and postcolonial immigrants. This is symbolically reflected in the decision to have minority integration and urban policies fall under the responsibility of the same minister (since 1998). Promoting civil order in these neighborhoods — enforcing the law, instating norms of sociability, increasing civic involvement — thus came to be seen as a central component of a larger struggle to protect or restore the nation’s integrity.

In Belgium, the central and regional governments have been traditionally favoring rural and suburban rather than urban areas (De Decker et al., 2005) but since the 1990s different territorial policies have been developed. As in the Netherlands, stigmatized and deprived urban neighborhoods were considered as the frontline of multicultural society. The extreme right party Vlaams Blok (now called Vlaams Belang) achieved its first major electoral victories in these areas. Flanders’ political establishment was shocked into action and funded local actors, in particular welfare agencies, to engage in civil renewal — by funding neighborhood centers, job programs and community initiatives, the government hoped to change the conditions giving rise to the Vlaams Blok (Loopmans et al., 2002). When, in the late 1990s, the Vlaams Blok also had considerable success outside the urban core, urban policy shifted gears: while initially the focus was on strengthening social cohesion and emancipation of disenfranchised groups, since the late 1990s the government is, at least rhetorically, more committed to integrated neighborhood development, including the promotion of gentrification (Loopmans et al., 2010). Although the conditions in Flanders were very different from those in the Netherlands — which lacked the anti-urban political history as well as the prominence of an extreme right party based in cities — the policies in both countries converged to the degree that in Flanders, too, the civilizing of neighborhoods was key to a more comprehensive project to restore the unity of the nation. As in the Netherlands, the Flemish government worked with local partners to restore civil order in these neighborhoods to reduce or limit their role as incubators of norms and values dangerous to (the establishment’s view on) the nation’s integrity.

In the UK, as in the Netherlands, the government has over the last three decades unleashed market forces in various domains of society while simultaneously developing ambitious strategies of physical and social renewal in areas with weak market positions. The exact way this paradox played out depended upon the balance of power between urban and national administrators. While Conservative governments have developed a number of urban policies, the Labour government has been most ambitious in its attempts to activate communities in deprived urban districts, invest in ‘regeneration’ and promote ‘housing market renewal’. Governmental interest in deprived areas has been driven at least in part by the actual or potential violence emanating from these areas, in the form of large-scale clashes in areas like Brixton or Bradford or in mundane expressions of animosity and antipathy. As in the Netherlands, the perceived failure of national models of integration (race relations and multiculturalism) has inaugurated a search for alternative frameworks around community cohesion that prioritize the integration of poor minority groups through their incorporation in neighborhood and cities (Amin, 2005; Worley, 2005).

There are clearly important differences between these countries but they also share interesting commonalities. In all cases, governments nominally committed to facilitating market forces develop comprehensive programs for integral neighborhood development. The unfolding of comprehensive urban policies can indeed be seen as an example of roll-out neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002) when privatization goes together with the creation of institutions that absorb the shocks that might arise from unfettered market forces. Deprived and defamed neighborhoods thus become sites where pastoral and
liberal politics coalesce. It is feared that tensions within these neighborhoods — especially multicultural tensions — may dislocate society as a whole. Because of the interdependencies between what goes on in these areas and the nation, the tensions are more than a local affair. Cities and nations are perceived to be in a symbiotic relationship. In line with this, segregation and divisions are considered important threats for cities but also for society, implying that territorial policies aimed at regeneration serve as curative or preventative interventions that save the nation as a whole from degeneration. To counter the development of ‘parallel life worlds’ (as in the UK; Phillips and Harrison, 2010), prevent ‘concentration neighborhoods’ (as in the Netherlands; Uitermark, 2003) or stop people from turning their backs on democracy (as in Belgium; Loopmans et al., 2002), central governments formed coalitions with local partners. Incorporating deprived neighborhoods into the nation and neutralizing the threats arising from them became a central, perhaps the overarching, theme of urban policy. By territorializing policies — i.e. designing policies for specific, designated areas — urban marginality came to be governed in specific ways. The following section discusses how marginalized neighborhoods are governed and how territorialization performs crucial roles for managing — as opposed to solving or ignoring — social problems.

Rationalities and technologies of integration

Political rationalities refer to ‘practices for the formulation and justification of idealized schemata for representing reality, analyzing it and rectifying it — as a kind of intellectual machinery or apparatus for rendering reality thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to political programming’ (Rose, 1996: 42). In analyzing political rationalities pertaining to advanced marginality, I focus on notions that may be popular among some segments of policymakers in different parts of the world but can be considered hegemonic in the West European context.

Community cohesion

In their conceptions of deprived neighborhoods, authorities combine pastoral with liberal politics in the sense that they reconfigure and draw upon communal and family relations to exercise control and promote discipline beyond the state (Donzelot, 1979; Cohen, 1985). The popularity of a concept like ‘social capital’ fits with the trend that governments aim at and rely on relations and institutions beyond the state. Engaging the neighborhood community in governing efforts has been key to urban policies throughout Western Europe. The SIF in Flanders aimed to improve social relations among neighborhood residents in an attempt to involve them in the management of their neighborhoods and prevent them from turning their ‘backs to democracy’ (the code word for extreme right sympathies, as used in Vlaamse Raad, 1995: 23). In the Netherlands, large-scale attempts to increase social capital in neighborhoods and especially between different ethnic groups started with the social renewal policy and then various rounds of neighborhood-oriented policy (e.g. Verhoeven and Tonkens, 2011). The ambition to involve neighborhood communities is most explicitly expressed in British urban policy, starting with the ‘New Deal for Communities’ (Lawless, 2004) and resurfacing with recent attempts to construct the ‘big society’ by empowering local communities to manage their affairs (Blond, 2010).

Communities are considered important ‘partners’ in all kinds of state projects while at the same time the nature of these projects — aiming to increase ‘social capital’, promote social interaction, enlarge ‘social cohesion’ and so on — suggests communities are inherently fragile or even non-existent. While governance actors seek to include and involve ‘the local community’, the paradox is that the very reason for the interventions is that these communities have lost much of their former cohesion as a result of social
fragmentation and symbolic splintering (Wacquant, 2008: 244–6). The ‘neighborhood community’ can, however, become a productive myth if enough people believe and invest in it (cf. Anderson, 1991). There is a concerted effort on the part of governance actors to construct communities and subsequently mobilize them through quasi-representative organs. Community involvement thus becomes a governmental project (Marinetto, 2003). Authorities are interested in fostering those forms of social capital they can call on in their efforts to govern territories and populations. By calling on communities — especially when it is unlikely that spontaneous mobilization will occur — a new collective identity (the neighborhood community) is attached to the new unit of government (‘the neighborhood’). Rather than mobilizing already existing communities, governance actors in deprived neighborhoods attempt to construct and shape communities towards specific ends (cf. Cruikshank, 1999; Rose, 2000b). One of the major reasons that the governing of neighborhoods takes on a paternalistic and disciplinary form is that the formation of communities is now something that is achieved through governmental programs directed at neighborhood communities rather than civil action directed at governments. After a period of strong resident activism in the 1980s, states have first co-opted antagonistic neighborhood organizations (Mayer, 2007) and are presently creating new coalitions in which select groups of residents and associations are incorporated as ‘partners’ for government (Nicholls, 2006). Thus, the neighborhood has emerged as a site where the promotion of cohesion aids attempts of governance actors to constitute and mobilize communities that coincide with the unruly territories they seek to govern.

Social exclusion and citizenship

Social exclusion has become a key term in discourses regarding poverty and deprivation. The genesis of the contemporary usage of the term ‘social exclusion’ can be found in the French republican discourse of citizenship (Atkinson, 2000). In principle, this concept allows policymakers and analysts to trace back deprivation in a specific socio-temporal context to processes operating on a larger scale and it therefore potentially focuses attention on general processes rather than their specific outcomes. However, after the term had been adopted and disseminated by European policymakers, it gained a larger number of narrower meanings (ibid.). The term was increasingly understood as a condition of individuals rather than as a feature of social processes. Thus, it became possible to talk about social exclusion as a phenomenon that occurred more in some places than in others. There is a strong relation between the popularity of the concept of social exclusion and the increasing popularity of a neighborhood-based approach to social problems. The founding of the British Social Exclusion Unit in 1997 is emblematic in that it framed social exclusion as processes that affect individuals and neighborhoods (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001). The central idea is that various kinds of problems accumulate and reinforce each other in neighborhoods which therefore become the preferred site of intervention. While the Social Exclusion Unit was transformed into the smaller Social Exclusion Taskforce in 2010, the emphasis of policies combating exclusion has remained at the level of neighborhoods (rather than, for example, industrial districts). The Netherlands, Germany, France, Denmark, Sweden and Belgium have also adopted neighborhood-based programs to fight social exclusion. A range of agencies and institutions have been set up that administer these rights and obligations. Thus, the neighborhood has emerged as the scale on which a range of specific measures can effectuate a sort of surrogate citizenship: the networks and processes from which deprived households are excluded may operate far beyond the neighborhood yet the neighborhood has become a site where compensation for exclusionary processes could be provided through a range of specific projects and programs. These neighborhood programs are supposed to provide residents of deprived neighborhoods with the civil, political and social rights that had been administered through the nation state (Marshall, 1950) but with a vengeance as it is now believed that these rights come with obligations.
that have to be enforced. For this reason, neighborhoods are sites where people can claim their rights, and even more so, sites where the government organizes tutelage and guidance — the modalities of pastoral politics — to enforce these obligations.

Technologies of integration

The previous section identified political rationalities of integration, showing how neighborhoods, their populations and especially the excluded segments of their populations have been cast as objects and subjects of governance. While political rationalities serve to perceive reality in such a way that it becomes possible to enact programs of government, governmental technologies are the actual means by which programs of government take shape. ‘Technologies of government’ refer to ‘strategies, techniques and procedures through which different authorities seek to enact programs of government in relation to the materials and forces to hand and the resistances and oppositions anticipated or encountered’ (Rose, 1996: 43). Like rationalities, technologies are only effective to the extent that they can be general and specific: measures have to be developed that are sensitive to local conditions and contingencies while allowing specificities to be expressed in a uniform vocabulary. The four technologies discussed here — monitoring, local–central exchange, social mixing and integral policymaking — enable central authorities and local governance to jointly perceive and act on the diverse realities they are confronted with in various localities.

Monitoring

To intervene in neighborhoods, they first have to be legible. Any central authority seeking to enact government in a large number of different localities is confronted with the fact that at each particular moment there is an endless variety of problems within its jurisdiction. Central authorities and their local partners therefore constantly search for concepts and measuring devices suitable for coding the unique combination of circumstances in various localities in such a way that it becomes possible to develop standardized responses. Measuring and mapping instruments play a pivotal role in translating local realities and problems on the ground into codes that are mobile, stable and combinable, thereby making it possible to govern from a distance and on the spot (Latour, 1987). One example is the livability monitor (the leefbaarometer) developed by Dutch housing corporations and adopted by the government, which condenses the complex realities of neighborhoods into a single score (Uitermark, 2005). Another example is the so-called ‘safety index’ that the municipality of Rotterdam developed in the wake of the electoral victory of the Pim Fortuyn’s populist right-wing party Leefbaar Rotterdam (Noordegraaf, 2008). Obviously such translations involve biases. In these cases, high shares of low-income or minority groups are counted as negative indicators of livability and safety, revealing that the housing corporations and government consider a neighborhood livable or safe when it consists of native Dutch middle-class households. Monitoring thus very clearly reflects the interests and views of authorities that use proxies to discover which neighborhoods might require intervention.

Similar instruments have been used in other countries to monitor the national territory and areas in which locality problems may occur. The goal is to detect worrying developments or threats, though what counts as such obviously depends on national circumstances. In Belgium, for example, policymakers on a local and national level have produced ‘poverty atlases’ that show which areas are in need of territorial interventions. The poverty atlas was developed in response to the electoral victories of the Vlaams Blok which drew its support largely from deprived urban neighborhoods (Loopmans et al., 2002). The poverty atlas embodies a discourse that links the support for xenophobic voting to the living conditions in deprived neighborhoods. These procedures have the
effect of territorializing, and to some extent reifying, social problems. They carry the promise that social problems do not require a fundamental reconsideration of how society is constituted but can be managed through targeted interventions in areas where they manifest themselves. Often the goal is, as was the case with the UK New Deal for Communities, to discover through statistical analysis to what extent and on which issues deprived communities score relatively low and then to take measures to change them (move them closer to the average) (Lawless, 2004). These monitoring technologies thus represent the technological counterpart to rationalities framing the neighborhood as a site for intervention because they standardize local specificities in ways that make territories understood and therefore amenable to programs of government (cf. Latour, 1987).

Local–central exchange and cooperation

To intervene in local realities, central authorities have to enlist local actors. The most important technology used for this purpose is a contract between the central government and the local government in which the former agrees to provide financial support on the condition that the latter meets certain criteria. The central governments of the Netherlands and Belgium have, as a rule, agreed to whatever plans local governments have put forward. There are no cases of cities being refused funds or having to pay back funds because they failed to meet their demands. The UK bid formula is somewhat more demanding as cities are expected to compete for the same funds.

While in some countries, notably the UK under Thatcher (Imrie and Thomas, 1999), tensions have been evident between local and national governments, the contract formula has facilitated a more cooperative relationship between different government levels. Contracts and negotiations serve to create a situation in which local and national governments can mutually adjust their plans and ambitions (Raco and Imrie, 2000; Raco, 2003). Decentralization does not simply involve a shift of power from one level to the other but rather a process of ‘enforced self-regulation’ (Crawford, 2006) when the requirement to develop coordinated responses induces local governance actors to cooperate and self-organize on the basis of local relations and identities. Moreover, central authorities enlist local governance actors; and local governance actors call on central authorities to assist with managing territories. In other words, local–central relations, in the present advanced liberal policy context, do not have a zero-sum character. When the strategic interests of central government and local governance actors are brought in line with each other, their joint capacity of exercising control over deprived neighborhoods increases.

Social mixing

Apart from legibility and coordination across scales, governance in neighborhoods requires the presence of a civil society that acts in line with rather than against government. As policymakers feel that residents of deprived areas lack the competence or will to perform such a role, they have attempted to reconfigure the neighborhood composition. Such reconfiguration often goes under the name of ‘social mixing’. Social mixing or the creation of ‘balanced neighborhoods’ is a central objective of governments throughout Europe (Smith, 2002; Musterd, 2005). In the Netherlands, the restructuring policy, initiated in 1997 and continued in various forms since, aims to retain or bring in middle-class households by promoting homeownership (either through the sale of social housing or the replacement of old social housing with new owner-occupied dwellings). In the UK, the ‘HMR Pathfinder program aims to regenerate “failing” neighborhoods and housing markets through selective demolition and housing improvement’ (Phillips and Harrison, 2010: 228). The central government in Belgium does not have the same resources at its disposal as the Dutch and UK governments, but nevertheless tries to bring about social mixing by selectively upgrading the stock in deprived neighborhoods (Loopmans et al., 2010).
At the root of the desire to achieve a social mix in deprived neighborhoods is the attribution of desirable behavior to middle-class households. For example, it is expected that affluent households will serve as positive role models for disadvantaged youths. Empirical research on the effects of neighborhood composition on the performance of individuals shows that social mixing strategies do little to improve the social mobility of poorer households (Ostendorf et al., 2001). However, while scholars often assume that governments promote social mixing because they believe it counteracts negative neighborhood effects, there may be other reasons of a more realpolitik nature to increase the share of middle classes. As pointed out above, there is no reason to assume that government policy is intended to improve the position of the most disadvantaged. Apart from improving the chances of social success for deprived poor households, social mixing can perform vital roles for exercising social control.

First, social mixing implies the reduction of groups regarded as problematic, such as deprived households or ethnic minorities. Reducing social or affordable housing is a comparatively cheap and efficient way for local governance actors to reduce their burden by altering the composition of the neighborhood population (see Haworth and Manzi, 1999; Goodchild and Cole, 2001; Uitermark et al., 2007). Social mixing is a ‘means to an end — the end being the establishment of a multifaceted system of control in disadvantaged neighborhoods that would make these places easier to manage’ (Uitermark, 2003: 546). Social mixing is usually part of more comprehensive strategies, enacted by broad coalitions with housing corporations or municipal governments at their core, to prevent or punish undesirable behavior (Flint, 2003). Social mixing is, again, a combination of liberal and pastoral politics as it is employed by governments that seek to unleash market forces while wanting to retain their power to govern deprived and defamed neighborhoods.

Second, middle-class households can fulfill an important role because they embody respect for the state and therefore can extend its power. The rescaling of responsibilities towards the neighborhood can only be successful when neighborhood residents actually participate and help to implement and sometimes even formulate policies. Middle-class households are expected to fulfill this role exactly; they come to neighborhood meetings, they call the police when there is trouble, they vote more often and they exert informal control, in all cases helping authorities to maintain social order and uphold legitimacy (Uitermark, 2003). Therefore, the sponsoring of gentrification (see, for example, Smith, 2002) is a way to create the necessary base and infrastructure to facilitate the civilizing areas of marginality.

Integral and joined-up policies

While in the past policy was administered through specialized and largely independent compartments, contemporary urban policymakers feel that interdepartmental cooperation is necessary to effectively intervene in neighborhoods. In the UK, ‘joined-up government’ is the preferred term; in the Netherlands and Belgium, policymakers strive for ‘integral policy’. While the introduction of market simulations in urban policy has pitted some governance actors against each other, governance actors embrace the idea of cooperation and try to break down walls between different departments and sectors. The fact that so many agencies now report that government is hopelessly compartmentalized shows us not that this problem has been exacerbated in recent years but rather that it has come to be seen as a problem. Centrally administered, rights-based collective consumption operates well through sectoral specialization but integral government — the pastoral politics of governing each and all (Foucault, 1991: 92) — requires strong coordination and shared norms among the various governance actors operating in an area. A multiplication or strengthening of connections between different governance actors — government agencies, quasi-governmental organizations, selected resident
representatives — creates a constant pressure to break down idiosyncratic or exceptional institutions that do not fit with the logic of the network in which they are (becoming) embedded.

While interactions can by themselves induce actors to develop a common language (e.g. ‘livability’) and evaluate their actions in the norms suggested by that language, a range of governmental technologies has put extra pressure on actors to adjust their actions according to a mutually defined logic. One of the emblematic examples in this context are the plans that governmental coalitions now have to make to qualify for support from the central state. ‘City visions’ or ‘neighborhood visions’ are expressly intended to bring local actors together to develop a common language that helps them to synergize their efforts. Whereas central governments in the past tended to hand down tasks, now they encourage local actors to decide which goals should be pursued and what are the appropriate means. Different segments of the (local) government (for example, between departments for ‘social’ or ‘economic’ affairs) are now, more than before, encouraged to look for shared interests. Plans and visions often have to include a list of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ points of the territory in question, forcing actors to act on a shared geographical identity. In addition, the variety and intensity of cooperation between different actors is often seen by the central government in and by itself as a criterion for granting funds. Actors are encouraged to think of themselves as place based and to articulate their interests vis-à-vis other places rather than vis-à-vis, for example, other classes or sectors.

Apart from these interactions that simultaneously discipline and reward members of interorganizational networks, there is a separate reason why integral approaches to urban problems have become increasingly popular. Integral policy makes it possible to exercise control over different aspects of an individual’s life in a coordinated fashion. Sharing information and coordinating activities can help to ‘integrially’ control territories and monitor individuals. This is actually an explicit goal of policies which track individuals practically from the time they are born; they do so ‘by producing images of risky subjects as well as images of risk geographies when “neighborhoods” are screened for risks or when the “milieu” of risky subjects is charted and monitored’ (Schinkel, 2011: 373, emphasis in the original). Willem Schinkel (2011) refers to such efforts as ‘pre-pression’ and charts the numerous archives tracking children and youngsters through time and space. The neighborhood here appears as the platform through which professionals from various sectors have discussions and intervene. The aspiration to integrally condition the lives of individuals in disadvantaged neighborhoods is the technological counterpart of a political rationality that has as its main focus the exclusion of deprived individuals from multifaceted processes. The creation of neighborhood-based networks serves to discipline and empower both agencies and deprived households, creating a sort of ‘social panoptism’ (Wacquant, 2001) in which monitoring subjects are themselves monitored.

**Conclusion**

Relegation and repression have become increasingly salient strategies for achieving social control over unruly groups and territories. Whereas many authors suggested that the surveillance of borders between segregated areas is key to the governing of marginality in the USA and perhaps the postindustrial city generally, I suggest that — at least in Western Europe — a distinct integrationist regime for governing marginality has emerged. The political rationalities of this regime represent neighborhoods as sites where interventions to improve cohesion and tackle exclusion can help to remedy local problems while protecting the integrity of the nation; the neighborhood becomes a ‘power container’ (Giddens, 1987: 15–17) where administrative and governmental capacities are located and coordinated. Through a set of governmental technologies — monitoring, local–central exchange, social mixing and integral policymaking — central
authorities and local governance reconfigure neighborhoods so that they become governable. This regime does not incorporate (all) residents completely; it is not a total institution but represents a dynamic constellation combining elements of liberal and pastoral politics to gain or regain control over neighborhoods where the state’s monopoly over symbolic and physical violence is challenged.

The argument is that there is a need to examine attempts at promoting integration as strategies for achieving control over deprived territories and populations. Target groups may or may not benefit, but if we want to understand and explain the evolution of policies, we need an approach that does not seek to judge but to analyze policy. To that end, I have drawn on the work of Elias on state formation and civilizing process. Elias helps us to understand how the civilizing offensives aimed at stigmatized and disenfranchised groups may be explained (De Regt, 1984; De Swaan, 1988). To understand the precise forms policies take on, it is beneficial to complement his insights on state formation with the governmentality literature, which deals specifically with how authorities conceive and act on territories and populations (Foucault, 1991; 2009). In short, my argument is that policies can be analyzed by examining the interdependencies among actors, the political rationalities they develop and the governmental technologies through which they reconfigure neighborhoods. While I have made my argument with reference to the countries of Western Europe, where interdependencies between strata and territories are relatively strong, there is every reason to believe that the drive for integration can be found in other places where neither complete banishment nor full incorporation are likely. For instance, although the notion of ‘integration’ does not serve as a specter for governance in the USA, the restructuring of public housing estates and governmental intrusions into the life worlds of the urban poor (including drug testing) may have similar origins and effects as the rationalities and technologies discussed here.

One important question is how the economic and budgetary crises affect the integrationist regime of governing marginality. On the one hand, it appears that states will have fewer resources to direct at the management of deprived neighborhoods. Many of the rationalities and technologies discussed here are typical of what Peck and Tickell (2002) call ‘roll-out neoliberalism’ and what Brenner (2004) refers to as ‘flanking mechanisms’. As states focus on rescuing the market and cutting their budgets, one might expect that the forces of segregation and polarization become too overwhelming to manage. On this reading, we may expect states to temper their ambitions and retreat from the micromanagement of marginalized populations and territories. On the other hand, the crises make it even less plausible than before that states can and will steer at a macro level, thus leaving micro-level management as the only and last resort. Indeed, the recent revolts in France and the UK did not trigger a reconsideration of macro-level policies but rather allocated blame — and therefore the potential solution — to the groups revolting. The ‘community’ or the ‘Big Society’ is supposed to do what the government cannot do: remedy and manage the incivilities that plague urban habitats.

Even though the integrative measures to mitigate urban tensions compare favorably with relegation, it is important to point out some disturbing features. At least to some extent, the frantic governmental activity that goes on in deprived neighborhoods, including benign and well intended actions, can be seen as a response to the failure of states to curb the general processes that produce deprivation in particular places. Whereas governments in the Fordist era attenuated class antagonism at the national level, now governance actors attempt to manage the outcomes of neoliberal globalization at the city and neighborhood level. The spatial partitioning of the urban poor and the creation of a web of control around their living environment can be seen as attempts on the part of all parties concerned, including select resident groups, to manage rather than remedy disintegrating processes operating far beyond the neighborhood.
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